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Abstract 
When is government expenditure likely to be procyclical? While economists tend to anticipate 
counter-cyclical expenditure, recent studies report procyclical expenditure. This paper explores 
the impact of political ideology on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are 
tested with reference to government expenditure in the USA between 1950 and 2008. The 
likelihood of procyclical expenditure increases if groups that press for increased public 
expenditure are‘…leaning against an open door’. 
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1. Introduction 
 Alesina et al. (2008) argue that economists tend to anticipate counter-cyclical government 
expenditure (to stabilise economies), even though recent empirical studies report procyclical 
expenditure. Government expenditure is procyclical when expenditure increases in an economic 
upturn and decreases in an economic downturn. Procyclical expenditure was first identified in 
developing countries (e.g. Gavin et al., 1996; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Végh, 2005; 
Woo, 2009), but now there is evidence of procyclical expenditures in OECD countries (e.g. 
Abbott and Jones, 2011; Arreaza et al., 1998; Hercowitz and Strawszynski, 2004; Lane, 2003).  
 In this paper the objective is to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government 
expenditure. There are normative rationales for counter-cyclical expenditure and for procyclical 
expenditure. Keynes advocated counter-cyclical intervention to minimise the social cost of 
unemployment and inflation. Lane (2003) argues that procyclical expenditures will maximise 
social welfare if public-sector goods are complements for private-sector goods (produced in 
competitive markets). By comparison, this paper explores the proposition that it is the mix of 
incentives that vote-maximising politicians face over the economic cycle, which can explain the 
pattern of government cyclicality.  
  Buchanan and Wagner (1977) emphasise this distinction. They argue that politicians 
have incentives to increase government expenditure to win votes. Politicians are more indulgent 
if there is fiscal illusion. The more that governments borrow, the more voters under-estimate the 
‘tax cost’ of government spending. In economic downturns (when governments rely heavily on 
deficit finance), fiscal illusion is pervasive. Buchanan and Wagner are critical that the Keynesian 
rationale provides politicians with the justification to borrow to increase public expenditure. R.F. 
Harrod (Keynes’ biographer) stated that Keynes believed economic policy would be made by 
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“…a small group of enlightened men…in accordance with the ‘public interest’” (cited by 
Buchanan and Wagner, 1977: 84). Buchanan and Wagner are more critical. They argue that 
politicians make decisions to increase the likelihood that they will win elections.  
 Lane (2003) provides a rationale for procyclical expenditure but, once again, there is a 
distinction between explanations based on a welfare-maximising rationale and explanations 
based on political ambition. When explaining procyclical government expenditure, Lane and 
Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) identify the significance of ‘voracity effects’. 
Voracity effects are experienced when political pressures to increase public expenditures 
increase as national income increases. Lane (2003) tested the proposition that political pressures 
are relevant in the OECD. He measured the impact of pressures for increased public spending in 
the OECD with reference to Henisz’s (2000) index of ‘power dispersion’. The index, based (in 
part) on differences between group preferences, was statistically significant when explaining the 
cyclicality of some government budgets, e.g. when explaining procyclical government wage 
expenditure. 
 It is impossible to ignore the importance of political pressures but this paper also 
emphasises the importance of politicians’ responses to political pressures. It acknowledges that 
changes in ‘demand’ for public expenditure are important over the economic cycle but it also 
focuses on the variables that influence the ‘supply’ of public expenditure. Are politicians more 
willing to increase government expenditure in an economic upturn (than in an economic 
downturn)? Are left-wing politicians more willing to respond than right-wing politicians? Are 
politicians more indulgent if they feel secure in political office?  
 The argument in this paper is that willingness to accommodate pressure in an economic 
upturn is particularly important when predicting the cyclicality of government expenditure. 
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Downs (1957) argued that vote-maximising politicians are myopic. In their attempt to win 
electoral support, they discount future difficulties. But the more they indulge pressures to 
increase expenditure in an economic upturn, the more they face difficulty sustaining government 
spending in an economic downturn – and the greater the likelihood of procyclical government 
expenditure. 
 Section two of the paper focuses on the variables that influence willingness to 
accommodate pressures to increase government expenditure. It highlights the importance of 
political ideology but, more generally, it argues that government expenditure is likely to be 
procyclical when the groups that press for public expenditure are ‘…leaning against an open 
door’.  
 Section three of the paper presents the economic model and the data used to test 
predictions. Section four considers the empirical results. The final section of the paper focuses on 
policy implications. 
 
2. Accommodating Pressures to Increase Government Expenditure 
 In a Keynesian world, the rationale for counter-cyclical expenditure relies on the 
observation that prices and wages do not adjust efficiently. In a neoclassical world (with 
competitive markets) the rationale for procyclical expenditure relies on the observation that 
private-sector goods are complements for public-sector goods (Lane, 2003). 1 The question is 
                                                          
1 There is also a neoclassical rationale for procyclical government intervention to correct market failure. Alesina et 
al. (2008:1007) argue that spending might be procyclical to correct the failures experienced in capital markets 
(especially in developing countries). They argue that government spending is more likely to be procyclical if 
governments face borrowing constraints; “...in bad times ...countries cannot borrow, or can do so only at very high 
interest rates, therefore they cannot run deficits and have to cut spending; in booms, they can borrow more easily 
and choose to do so, increasing public spending...”. 
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whether these rationales explain the decision to spend counter-cyclically, and the decision to 
spend procyclically.  
 Focussing on ‘demand’, the size of groups that press for public expenditure is important 
(e.g. Olson, 1971; Becker, 1983; 1985). As producer groups are smaller than consumer groups, 
they are more effective. When Becker (1983:385) analysed political competition for government 
subsidies, he argued that “…politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of 
the groups taxed to pay their subsidies”.  Lane (2003: 2665) reports a greater likelihood of 
procyclical capital expenditure than procyclical current expenditure (explaining that 
“....individual voters…care most about public consumption goods or transfers… (but) business 
interests… (care more about) …the infrastructure....”).  
 While demand is relevant, variables that influence politicians’ willingness to 
accommodate demand are also likely to be important when predicting procyclical government 
spending. 2 Consider the relevance of:  
(a) Fiscal Illusion 
 Politicians are wary that the cost of indulging groups that press for expenditure is that the 
electorate might fear an increase in taxation. If an increase in public expenditure increases votes, 
an increase in taxation loses votes. Politicians are likely to be more willing to accommodate 
pressures in an economic upturn. In an economic upturn, tax revenues are increasing. Politicians 
do not have to announce new taxes (or new tax rates). Craig and Heins (1980) demonstrate that, 
with progressive taxation, tax revenues increase and levels of government spending are sensitive 
                                                          
2 While federal governments are able to borrow in an economic downturn (to sustain indulgent expenditure 
commitments), there are costs and the costs limit the extent to which they can borrow. Sub-central governments find 
it more difficult because there are usually limits on the extent to which they can borrow. There is evidence that sub-
central governments (in federations) are more likely to spend procyclically when there are borrowing constraints. 
Abbott and Jones (2012b) employ the index of budget autonomy of local government produced by Rodden (2002) to 
report a negative correlation between the degree of budget autonomy and the cyclicality of sub-central government 
spending in a group of OECD countries. 
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to the income elasticity of tax revenues. Other things equal, government spending is higher, the 
higher the income elasticity of tax revenue. 
 Andersen and Nielsen (2008:34) argue that in an economic upturn (with economic 
prosperity) there is a “…lack of fiscal transparency…”. Focussing on the OECD, they argue that 
one implication is that “… a procyclical fiscal policy is a phenomenon that is typically 
associated with times of economic prosperity…” (p.34). 
 If willingness to spend in an economic upturn is important, the first prediction is that:  
(i) Government spending is more likely to be procyclical in an economic upturn than 
in an economic downturn.  
 
 If voters are more likely to under-estimate tax costs in an economic upturn, they are also 
likely to be more aware of expenditures from some budgets than from others. They know more 
about expenditures that impact directly on their day-to-day life (Downs 1960).3 They know more 
about current expenditure than capital expenditure. Risk-averse politicians are aware that voters’ 
concern about future taxation is likely to be greater if they increase current expenditure in an 
economic upturn than if they increase capital expenditure. If the first prediction in this paper 
focuses on fiscal awareness over the economic cycle, the second focuses on fiscal awareness 
across government budgets. Risk–averse politicians are more likely to accommodate demands 
for the expenditures that are least likely to alarm the electorate. The ‘small’ groups that demand 
an increase in expenditure are likely to be more effective when they press for an increase in 
capital expenditure. 
                                                          
3 In questionnaire surveys, voters attach a higher priority to domestic expenditure (social security, health care, 
education) than to ‘international affairs’ (see Jones, 2006 for further analysis). 
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The same argument applies when analysing intergovernmental transfers. Local politicians 
have incentives to compete for intergovernmental transfers to mitigate the need for local 
taxation. Mueller (2003:223) focuses on these incentives and notes that“....the more the 
government spends holding taxes constant the happier voters are…” and “…the higher the 
probability of incumbent politicians being re-elected…”.4As voters are not aware of changes in 
inter-governmental transfers, risk-averse politicians in federal governments are more likely to 
accommodate pressure for an increase in intergovernmental transfers in economic upturns.  
 The second prediction is therefore that: 
(ii) Expenditures from capital accounts and transfers from federal to local 
governments are more likely to be procyclical in an economic upturn than 
expenditures from current accounts. 
 
 (b)  Political ideology 
 A well-established literature insists that politicians on the left are more likely to increase 
government expenditure than politicians on the right.5 In this paper, attention focuses on the 
Democrats and the Republicans in the USA. Mueller (2003) reports Democrats have a greater 
willingness to increase government expenditure. Republicans are more likely to prefer market 
solutions than government solutions.  
                                                          
4 Grossman (1989) explains why local representatives press for transfers and why politicians at federal government 
accommodate these pressures. “The federal politician uses his redistributive powers to buy…loyalty…This loyalty 
manifests itself in the state politician’s political endorsement of, and electoral support for, the federal politicians 
and the marshalling of the state politician’s local supporters” (Grossman, 1989; 585). 
5 Potrafke (2011) considers the impact of ideology on the composition of public spending. Surveying the literature 
that deals with ideology, he notes that: “Leftish parties appeal more to the labor base and promote expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies whereas right-wing parties appeal more to capital owners and are therefore more 
concerned with reducing inflation.” (p.103). 
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 If left-wing politicians are ideologically more inclined to spend in an economic upturn 
(and to deliver rents to their supporters in this way), right-wing politicians are more likely to 
deliver rents to their supporters by reducing tax rates.  
 The third prediction is therefore that: 
(iii) Government expenditure is likely to be more procyclical if there is a left-wing 
(Democrat) president than if there is a right-wing (Republican) president. 
 
(c)  The Cost of Accommodating Political Pressures 
 The extent to which politicians are willing to accommodate pressures for increased public 
expenditure also depends on the ease with which they are able to accommodate pressures. It is 
easier to accommodate pressure for public expenditure if political-party preferences reflect the 
preferences of the median voter. 6 
 In this context, one important consideration is the extent to which the same political party 
is in office across all branches of government. The costs of accommodating pressures to increase 
public spending will be low and it will be easy to get agreement across the different branches of 
government to endorse an increase in expenditure. Any US president is likely to face lower 
political costs increasing public spending when it is possible to rely on support at Capitol Hill. 
For a Democratic President, a proposal to increase spending will meet less resistance if the 
Democratic Party has a majority in both the Senate and in the House of Representatives.  
 The fourth testable prediction is that: 
                                                          
6 Cusak (1997:378) notes that appealing to the median voter “… restricts the possibility of a government with 
partisan preferences from imposing policies that accord with its position on the left-right scale and forces it to 
accept policies distant from that position”. However, it is important to acknowledge that economic constraints are 
also likely to be relevant, e.g. Helleiner (1994) notes that international financial integration constrains government 
autonomy. 
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(iv) Expenditures from current and capital accounts are more likely to be procyclical 
if there is a Democratic president, if there is an economic upturn, and if the 
Democratic Party has a majority in the Senate and in the House of 
Representatives. 
  
 Willingness to spend in an economic upturn depends on ideology (political-party 
preference) and on the electoral costs of increasing public expenditure. The more that myopic 
politicians indulge pressures to spend in an economic upturn the more they face difficulty in an 
economic downturn. Right-wing politicians may be less likely to increase public expenditure in 
an economic upturn, but they are more likely to be willing to reduce taxation in an economic 
downturn. In an economic downturn it is easier to make the case to reduce taxation to stabilise 
the economy. The final prediction is that: 
(v) Taxation is more to likely to be procyclical in an economic downturn if there is a 
Republican president. 
  
 In summary, the cyclicality of government spending depends on the mix of objectives and 
constraints over the economic cycle. Public expenditure is more likely to be procyclical in an 
economic upturn if the ideology is left of centre. Taxation is more likely to be procyclical in an 
economic downturn if the ideology is right of centre.  
 
3. The Model and Data 
 The five testable predictions presented in section two of the paper predict specific 
patterns of cyclical government spending (revenues). Collectively, they constitute a test of the 
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hypothesis that policy is sensitive to the specific (partisan) objectives of the politicians who are 
in office.  
 The cyclicality of spending and revenues can be estimated by utilizing the following 
regression models: 
        (1) 
     (2) 
for t=1,....,T 
where g denotes (the log of) total government spending, or one of its components, and  is 
either (the log of) total receipts or one component of government revenue. yt is the 
output gap, so  and  indicate the pattern of cyclicality in spending and revenue streams 
respectively. For example, when yt is statistically significant,  > 0 implies procyclical 
spending, while  < 0 indicates counter-cyclicality. When yt is statistically insignificant, 
spending is acyclical. t and t are both white noise error terms. The above model allows 
us to estimate the cyclicality of spending (revenues), while also accounting for potential 
persistence in fiscal policy, through the inclusion of gt-1 and t-1 in (1) and (2) 
respectively. 
 This paper focuses on the differences in cyclicality across Democrat and Republican 
Presidencies. Equations (1) and (2) can be extended to: 
   (3) 
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where DMP = 1 when the US President was a Democrat and DMP = 0 for a Republican 
President. (DMPt × ∆yt) is the interaction term between the presidential party and the 
output gap, which allows us to ascertain differences in the cyclical responses of spending 
and revenues between Democrat and Republican Presidents. We can derive separate 
cyclicality estimates: for example,  is the spending cyclicality coefficient for 
Republican Presidents and  is the Democrat President cyclicality estimate. 
 As well as ascertaining whether the output gap impacts on the growth of spending 
(revenues), potential asymmetric responses over the economic cycle can be tested for by 
estimating separate coefficients for upturns and downturns. Upturns (downturns) arise 
when actual output is greater (less than) potential GDP. 
 Government expenditure and revenue data were obtained from the Office of 
Management and Budget, who produce historical tables for the budget of the US Federal 
government.7 Our sample period is 1950 to 2008 and all figures are in billions of constant 
fiscal year 2005 dollars. We consider Total Expenditure and the components: Current 
Expenditure and Capital Expenditure. Capital Expenditure itself is split into Direct 
Federal spending (Defence and Non-defence) and Federal grants to state and local 
governments. Capital spending constitutes 9.23% of the total spending over the sample 
period, Direct Federal Capital Expenditure averages 70.7% of the total, while 29.3% is 
spent on Federal grants to state and local governments. The composition of total receipts 
is as follows: 44.9% for Individual Income Taxes; 15.8% for Corporate Income Taxes; 
27.4% for Social Insurance Contributions; 9.4% for Excise Duties; and 4.5% for all Other 
                                                          
7 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals 
bˆ
bˆ + p2( )
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Revenues. The Federal fiscal year runs from 1st October to 30th September, so for 
example, fiscal year 2008 began on 1st October 2007 and ends 30th September 2008. Prior 
to 1977, the fiscal year ran from 1st July to 30th June, so a transition quarter, a separate 
accounting period, was introduced to bridge the period from the old fiscal year format to 
the new one. We estimate our model using all available annual observations, except the 
transition quarter. 
 To measure the output gap we use data on actual real GDP and potential real GDP 
in constant 2005 prices. Observations for both actual and potential real GDP were taken 
from the Congressional Budget Office’s estimates, which are published on an annual 
basis.8 The Congressional Budget Office defines real potential GDP as ‘a measure of 
maximum sustainable output – the level of real GDP in a given year that is consistent with 
a stable rate of inflation.’ (p1: Arnold, 2001). Potential output is estimated using a Solow 
growth model, incorporating a neoclassical production function, which is used to forecast 
potential GDP up to 10 years in advance. We align our GDP data to the Federal fiscal 
year, rather than the calendar year. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 The relationships described above were estimated using OLS. The test results for our first 
and second predictions are shown in table 1. Total Federal expenditure is acyclical, a result 
which is confirmed for both Dy
t
+
and Dy
t
-
.9 Current spending, which accounts for just over 90% 
of total spending, is not surprisingly also acyclical. In the first instance, it would appear that a 
                                                          
8 http://www.cbo.gov/publication/41880 
9 Acyclicality of general government spending (that encompasses all tiers of government) was also found by Fiorito 
(1997) and Talvi and Végh (2005) for a group of countries. 
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similar result holds also for total capital spending, where ∆yt is found not to be statistically 
significant. However, when separate estimates for the coefficients of Dy
t
+
and Dy
t
-
 are 
produced, there is a statistically significant but asymmetric response between upturns and 
downturns. 1ˆ  is positively signed, implying capital expenditures are procyclical during upturns, 
while bˆ2  implies counter-cyclicality during downturns. Thus the acyclicality result for the output 
gap can be explained by two oppositely signed but statistically significant effects.  
 Similar results are found for the components of capital spending, except for non-defence 
capital spending, which is found to be acyclical. The strongest cyclicality effect arises in the case 
of Federal capital spending on grants to state and local governments: these estimates are larger 
than those implied for total capital spending.10 Direct Federal capital spending is also procyclical 
in upturns but counter-cyclical for downturns, which is driven by the cyclicality of Defence 
Capital Expenditure. While producer groups are likely to be more effective lobbyists than 
consumer groups, producer groups are even more effective when explaining increases in defence 
expenditure (i.e, when analysing the influence of the ‘military-industrial complex’11).  
 Looking at the cyclical properties of spending for all tiers of government, Lane 
(2003) finds total government expenditures to be mildly counter-cyclical, a result which is 
confirmed for current spending. Government investment was found to be procyclical. 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE > 
                                                          
10 Intergovernmental transfers are an important source of revenue for sub-central governments, which in turn can 
contribute to the procyclicality of sub-central government spending (see for example, Abbott and Jones, 2012a). 
11 In 1961 President Eisenhower referred to the effectiveness of a ‘military industrial complex’ as a lobby group for 
increased government spending. For analysis of Eisenhower’s concerns see James Huston’s analysis at 
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Military-Industrial-Complex.html. 
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 Evidence in favour of the third testable hypothesis, ‘government expenditure is 
more likely to be procyclical when there is a left-wing (Democrat) president than when 
there is a right-wing (Republican) president’, comes from table 2, which reports separate 
spending cyclicality coefficients for Democrat and Republican Presidents. Differences in 
cyclicality responses arise across the tenures of the two presidential parties. For example, 
Total Expenditure is acyclical for Democrat Presidents but it is counter-cyclical for 
Republican Presidents, albeit mildly counter-cyclical. A similar result is found for Current 
Expenditure, which is not surprising given that it accounts for the largest proportion of the 
total spend.  
 Differences also arise with public investment: Capital Expenditure is procyclical 
for Democrat Presidents but acyclical for Republican Presidents. These results are mainly 
driven through Direct Federal Capital Expenditure and Defence Capital Expenditure, 
though Federal grants to state and local governments are also procyclical during the 
incidence of Democrat Presidents. Thus, the expectation that expenditures should be more 
procyclical for Democrat Presidents appears to hold for capital spending. 
< TABLE 2 NEAR HERE > 
  Differences in the cyclicality of spending can arise, not only due to political 
ideology, but according to whether current real output is above or below trend. Table 3 
presents separate estimates for Democrat and Republican presidencies during both upturns 
and downturns. It is apparent that the cyclicality of spending arises during the Democrat 
Presidencies but importantly only for economic upturns, consistent with our first and third 
predictions. Both Total Spending and Current Expenditure are procyclical during upturns, 
unlike the results presented in table 2, which suggested acyclicality during the tenures of 
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Democrat Presidents. Likewise Capital Expenditure is procyclical, particularly with 
respect to Direct Federal Defence spending. The cyclicality coefficients for Total Capital 
Spending; Direct Federal Capital Spending; and Defence Capital Spending are all larger 
during the upturns compared to when the full sample of observations is considered. 
Capital spending also tends to be more procyclical than current spending, consistent with 
our second prediction, ‘expenditures from capital accounts and intergovernmental 
transfers are more likely to be procyclical than expenditures from current accounts.’ 
Procyclicality for capital intergovernmental transfers is also found for Democrat Upturns, 
with a stronger effect implied than from the full sample of observations.  
 The evidence for Republican Presidents implies acyclicality for upturns and 
downturns, which contradicts the evidence of counter-cyclicality from the full sample of 
observations for Total Spending; Current Expenditure; Direct Federal Capital 
Expenditure; and Defence Capital Expenditure. 
< TABLE 3 NEAR HERE > 
 The evidence is also consistent with the proposition that the procyclicality of 
spending is affected by the political costs of implementing spending policies. Costs are 
likely to be lower when the President has the support of the Houses of Congress. We 
therefore investigated whether there are any significant differences in the cyclicality of 
spending, when the political party of the President has control of both houses of congress 
(see table 4). We see that this control appears to be important for Capital Expenditure 
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during upturns, specifically Direct Federal and Defence spending, but not in nearly every 
other case.12 
< TABLE 4 NEAR HERE > 
 Finally, turning to Federal government revenues it is apparent that the procyclicality is 
concentrated around episodes of the Republican Presidents, but only for Individual Income 
Taxes and Corporate Income Taxes (see table 5). The higher estimates for procyclical taxation 
when there is a Republican president is consistent, more generally, with evidence of the impact 
of political ideology on taxation (Angelopoulos et al., 2009). When the economy is in trouble, 
politicians’ first concern is to signal competence (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). As there is a 
rationale for tax cuts (to boost aggregate demand) the electoral risk to a Republican government 
is lower if they take the opportunity to reduce tax rates. Democrats may be cautious about 
increasing spending counter-cyclically in downturns (because of the fear of falling tax revenues 
and increasing costs of borrowing). Republicans are able to raise revenue procyclically, leaving 
citizens with a greater fraction of their income. 
< TABLE 5 NEAR HERE > 
4. Conclusions 
 This paper has focused on politicians’ willingness to accommodate pressures to increase 
public expenditure. The variables that explain willingness to accommodate pressures in an 
economic upturn are the variables that are significant when explaining the likelihood of 
procyclical government expenditure.  
 As vote-maximising politicians are wary that their actions will fuel the electorate’s fear of 
taxation, they are more willing to increase expenditure when there is fiscal illusion and when 
                                                          
12 Similar results are derived when interacting Presidency with control of the Senate and House of Representatives 
separately. 
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their party is in office in all branches of government. Left-wing political parties are more likely 
to reward supporters by increasing government expenditure (right-wing politicians are more 
likely to reduce taxes in an economic downturn). The likelihood of procyclical government 
expenditure increases if, in economic upturns, pressure for government expenditure is ‘…leaning 
against an open door’. 
 A long-established literature calls for constraints to restrain vote-maximising politicians 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). In the USA every state (with the exception of Vermont) has a 
balanced-budget rule. The nature and the extent of the rules differ across different states. In some 
states, the governor must present a balanced budget at the beginning of the fiscal year, in others 
the rule is that the budget must be balanced at the end of the year. One insight from studies that 
assess the efficacy of balanced-budget rules is that they are more effective the more voters are 
aware of the extent to which politicians comply (e.g. Poterba, 1996; Borge and Hopland, 2014).  
 Maravelle and Claeys (2012:753) describe the range of policy options that are available 
to “…tackle …procyclicality in spending”. They note that is possible to introduce expenditure 
constraints (Hauptmeier et al., 2011); to refine deficit rules, and to establish institutions (e.g. 
fiscal councils) to monitor fiscal sustainability. With evidence that the likelihood of procyclical 
government expenditure increases when there is fiscal illusion, here the policy recommendation 
is that there should be greater transparency. If balanced- budget rules are not designed to restrain 
politicians’ reliance on procyclical expenditure; voters should be made aware of changes in 
government expenditure at the end of the fiscal year. Changes should be reported in absolute 
terms, and as a proportion of the increase that would be anticipated if government expenditures 
had increased in line with their long-term trend.  
17 
 
 If lobby groups are “…leaning against an open door” (because politicians are able to rely 
on fiscal illusion), an increase in transparency will increase the likelihood that left-wing and 
right-wing politicians will respond more prudently when they experience an economic upturn.  
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Table 1: Cyclical Federal Spending 
 
    
 Output gap 
 
Upturn Downturn 
 yt Dy
t
+  Dyt
-
 
       
Total expenditure: 0.004 
(0.88) 
0.016 
(1.62) 
-0.006 
(-1.62) 
Current expenditure 0.004 
(0.84) 
0.016 
(1.59) 
-0.007 
(-1.58) 
Capital expenditure: 0.005 
(0.91) 
0.026* 
(2.35) 
-0.014* 
(-2.33) 
Direct federal: 0.006 
(0.84) 
0.032* 
(2.26) 
-0.017* 
(-2.76) 
Defence 0.005 
(0.66) 
0.033* 
(2.09) 
-0.019* 
(-2.81) 
Non-defence -0.003 
(-0.38) 
-0.011 
(-0.89) 
0.005 
(0.54) 
Federal grants to state 
and local government 
0.010 
(0.70) 
0.069* 
(2.49) 
-0.043* 
(-3.31) 
    
Notes: t-ratios (calculated from robust standard errors) are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Cyclical Federal spending: the effect of the Presidential Party 
 
 Democrat 
President 
 
Republican 
President 
Total Expenditure: 0.017 
(1.90) 
-0.006* 
(-2.35) 
Current Expenditure 0.016 
(1.86) 
-0.005* 
(-2.25) 
Capital Expenditure: 0.023* 
(3.19) 
-0.009 
(-1.88) 
Direct Federal: 0.029* 
(2.90) 
-0.010* 
(-2.19) 
Defence 0.029* 
(2.53) 
-0.011* 
(-2.03) 
Non-defence 0.009 
(0.75) 
-0.009 
(0.96) 
Federal grants to state 
and local government 
0.050* 
(2.30) 
-0.015 
(-0.98) 
   
Notes: see table 1. 
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Table 3: Cyclical Federal spending: the effect of Presidential Party during Upturns 
and Downturns 
 
 Democrat President Republican President 
 Upturn Downturn Upturn Downturn 
Total Expenditure: 0.029* 
(2.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.76) 
-0.009 
(-1.47) 
-0.004 
(-0.83) 
Current Expenditure 0.028* 
(2.15) 
-0.008 
(-0.85) 
-0.009 
(-1.49) 
-0.004 
(-0.83) 
Capital Expenditure: 0.037* 
(3.15) 
-0.004 
(-0.25) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.012 
(-1.84) 
Direct Federal: 0.052* 
(3.32) 
-0.015 
(-0.71) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.134 
(-1.96) 
Defence 0.055* 
(3.17) 
-0.022 
(-0.93) 
-0.005 
(-0.26) 
-0.015* 
(-2.01) 
Non-defence -0.0007 
(-0.04) 
0.027 
(0.90) 
-0.037* 
(-2.04) 
0.006 
(0.53) 
Federal grants to state 
and local government 
0.081* 
(2.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.31) 
0.043 
(0.93) 
-0.043* 
(-2.79) 
Notes: see table 1. 
 
Table 4: Cyclical Federal spending: the effect of coincidence between the President and 
both Houses of Congress 
 
 Democrat coincidence Republican coincidence 
 Upturn Downturn Upturn Downturn 
Total Expenditure: 0.0022 
(1.75) 
-0.011 
(-1.32) 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
Current Expenditure 0.022 
(1.74) 
-0.012 
(-1.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
-0.0005 
(-0.05) 
Capital Expenditure: 0.032* 
(2.47) 
-0.017 
(-1.71) 
0.013 
(1.15) 
0.013 
(0.70) 
Direct Federal: 0.045* 
(2.49) 
-0.022 
(-1.81) 
0.012 
(0.93) 
0.009 
(0.60) 
Defence 0.051* 
(2.75) 
-0.027 
(-1.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.21) 
0.020 
(1.56) 
Non-defence -0.033 
(-1.85) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
0.079* 
(2.02) 
-0.066 
(-1.03) 
Federal grants to state 
and local government 
0.067 
(1.75) 
-0.029 
(-1.21) 
0.003 
(0.15) 
0.073 
(1.33) 
Notes: see table 1.
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Table 5: Cyclical Federal Revenue: the effect of Presidential Party during 
Upturns and Downturns 
 
 Democrat President Republican President 
 Upturn Downturn Upturn Downturn 
Total Receipts: 0.010 
(1.72) 
0.012 
(1.47) 
0.007 
(0.60) 
0.015* 
(3.04) 
Individual Income Taxes 0.010 
(1.49) 
0.015 
(1.16) 
0.011 
(0.76) 
0.016* 
(2.88) 
Corporate Income Taxes 0.016 
(0.94) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
-0.025 
(-0.91) 
0.055* 
(3.95) 
Social Insurance & 
Retirement (on-budget) 
0.017 
(1.43) 
-0.008 
(-0.54) 
0.008 
(0.35) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
Social Insurance & 
Retirement (off-budget) 
0.018 
(1.58) 
-0.008 
(-0.48) 
0.015 
(1.48) 
0.010 
(1.95) 
Excise Taxes -0.012 
(-0.83) 
0.0006 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.27) 
0.008 
(0.80) 
Other -0.019 
(-1.18) 
0.011 
(0.52) 
0.049* 
(2.04) 
-0.017 
(-1.63) 
Notes: see table 1. 
